

WALTER L. PFORZHEIMER

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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20037

8 August 1979

Mr. Richard V. Allen

Washington, D.C. 20006

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Dear Dick:

Thank you for your letter of 6 August with its enclosure of the Intelligence Subcommittee's Policy Paper on Intelligence. I am pleased at your offer to allow dissenting views to be included in the printed version of the report. I regret not having had the opportunity of including dissenting comments in the paper released to the press on 6 August. I would appreciate your including my dissenting comments in the printed version substantially as follows:

As a member of Intelligence Subcommittee, I dissent from certain recommendations and statements included in this "Policy Paper." I do so with a background in the profession of intelligence of almost 40 years, some of them spent with the military and over 30 with CIA, from which I retired completely in 1977. These comments are not made in a parochial manner; they solely represent my own views and experience.

I am opposed to the recommendation that the President should have his own "chief adviser for intelligence matters" who would be located in the White House. His proposed role would appear to be that of interface between the President and his staff and the intelligence community. This concept has been considered in one form or another since 1944 and always has been found wanting. The proposed adviser's role as a "facilitator, coordinator and synthesizer" is thoroughly encompassed by the function of the Director of Central Intelligence, a position created by the National Security Act of 1947. Nor would his presence in the White House serve to "reassure the intelligence community at large that its products would be thoroughly reviewed and integrated into the policymaking process". There is no way that this White House "presence" can force the policymakers to read and utilize the substantive production of the intelligence community. This can best be done by maintaining a very high level of merit in those intelligence products; one can lead a horse to water but one cannot make him drink. The policymakers generally will only be convinced by demonstrated excellence. Furthermore, the creation of this White House position can only serve to politicize the intelligence functions, a condition to which this Subcommittee is strongly opposed. It will place another bureaucratic layer between the President and his policymakers on the one hand and the intelligence community on the other. This nebulous White House "presence" will certainly need a small staff to assist him, even though such a person should take no part

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in the actual drafting of substantive intelligence production. Small staffs tend to increase and become more bureaucratic. His role will increasingly conflict with the statutory role of the Director of Central Intelligence.

I strongly oppose this Policy Paper's concept of creating a "Foreign Operations Service" charged with clandestine collection, covert action and counterintelligence overseas. This is the present function of the Central Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Operations. The Policy Paper is silent as to where such a "Service" should be located, i.e., whether it would still remain within the CIA or become a new entity with its own director, separate and apart from CIA. This proposal, in one form or another, has been considered for decades, and the present concept of organization, retaining the Clandestine Service within CIA, is still the best solution. In a time when the size of government and budgetary considerations are important, this Subcommittee proposal would require a considerable addition and duplication of staff work and personnel, particularly in the administrative field, in support of the proposed newly created Service. While the Policy Paper says that present organization has become "increasingly concerned with the interpretation and collection of information", that is a good thing and not a bad one. Collection and interpretation of information is the be-all and end-all of a valid intelligence service. Nor would the creation of a new "Foreign Operations Service", with the role described in this Paper, solve those major collection tasks which are properly allocated to the National Security Agency and to those responsible for overhead reconnaissance, neither of which are an integral part of the Clandestine Services.

The Policy Paper is highly critical of substantive intelligence production in the field of estimates and similar papers. I cannot vouch for some of their comments, as I have not read the recent substantive intelligence production of the community. I believe that comments in the Policy Paper as to the alleged weakness of some of this production benefits from 20/20 hindsight. It does not give sufficient consideration to the fact that many of these papers were the best that could be done at the time with information then currently available. It goes without saying that one is never satisfied that one has enough information or enough material so that the community can properly assess foreign situations on every occasion. However, this Policy Paper's proposals of a production center for estimates in competition with the present CIA mechanism is seriously flawed. For one thing, it is uncertain where such a competitive center would be located, suggesting perhaps that it be in the Defense Intelligence Agency. This would raise the old problem that the State Department would never agree with the military elements being the sole competitive source of estimates, nor would a

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reverse position be acceptable to Defense. It is for that reason that the production capacity in the estimates field was centralized in CIA with the firm understanding that the final product would represent the joint production judgments of all of the appropriate elements of the intelligence community. In the end, this would appear to be the best governmental solution, particularly when the process allows for footnotes containing the reasoned dissentive position of any participating department or agency.

One can concur, however, with the Policy Paper's suggestion that outside scholars of the highest stature be brought in to assist in and review these estimates, before they are finalized. That is a way in which constructive competition might well be handled, provided that it be done. Experience in the past has indicated that such outsiders are often at a disadvantage because they have not been following classified traffic on a day-to-day basis and, therefore, have to spend much time in "reading-in". I concur in any reasonable steps that can be taken to improve the estimates on the basic assumption that they can always be improved. The present proposals in this Policy Paper, however, are much too "iffy" to have been included here as a basis for restructuring procedures.

Finally, the Congress and the public must be alert to any administration attempt to subordinate the intelligence community under the Director of Central Intelligence. The role of the Director, as established by the National Security Act of 1947, is essentially correct. Furthermore, the statute and presidential directives are sufficient to give the Director the power of coordination within the intelligence community which is essential. Above all, his should be the voice which presents the consolidated national intelligence budget to the President and the Congress. However, his field should essentially be limited to what is called "national" or "strategic" intelligence and he should not interfere in "departmental" or "tactical" intelligence which is prepared by the various elements of the community for the consumption of their Directors and Secretaries. The role of the Director of Central Intelligence should be the role envisaged in the 1947 Act; he should not function as a czar. His voice should be that of principal intelligence adviser to the President.

There are several other points which I feel could have been more felicitously expressed in this Paper, but the major ones are included in this dissent.

Sincerely,

WALTER PFORZHEIMER

P.S.

Dick: I am leaving on the morning of 9 August and will return in the late afternoon, 17 August. I will be in Nantucket, and, if you wish to be in touch with me about this, the telephone is

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